Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 6
Issue 2 Winter 2006: Climate Law Special Edition

Article 10

Comment on COP 11 to the UNFCCC
Scott J. Stone

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stone, Scott J. "Comment on COP 11 to the UNFCCC." Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Winter 2006, 45-46, 67.

This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

COMMENT ON COP 11 TO THE UNFCCC

T

by Scott J. Stone*

he Eleventh Conference of the Parties (“COP 11”) to
the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) took place in Montreal
from November 29 to December 6, 2005, drawing more than
9,000 participants from governments, UN bodies and agencies, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations,
and the media.1
The COP is an annual event under the UNFCCC, which
was negotiated in the two years leading up to the Rio de
Janeiro United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (or Earth Summit) in 1992. It entered into force
in 1994 and has been ratified by 188 countries, making it one
of the most universally supported international agreements and
the world’s major treaty regime dealing with climate change.2
Each year, Parties to the Convention (i.e. those states that have
ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to the treaty) meet at
the COP to foster and monitor its implementation and continue negotiations on how best to combat climate change.3
This year’s COP enjoyed the added significance of being
the site for the first Conference of the Parties serving as the
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (“COP/MOP 1”).
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was negotiated in 1997
and has endured a controversial and troubled existence since
the United States withdrew its support in 2001. The Protocol
could only enter into force if at least 55 Parties to the
Convention had ratified it, including enough industrialized
countries to cover 55 percent of that group’s greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions (as of 1990). Ratification by the Russian
Federation in November 2004 allowed the Protocol to enter
into force 90 days later on February 16, 2005.4
The Protocol places legally binding limits on GHG emissions by Annex I countries, which are industrialized countries
that were members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) in 1992 and countries with
economies in transition (the “EIT Parties”), which includes the
Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and
Eastern European states.5 If fully implemented and enforced,
the Protocol will reduce GHG emissions by 5.2 percent of
1990 levels by 2012.
The most important development at the COP 11 was the
agreement by all parties (except the United States and
Australia) to continue to negotiate future binding limits on
GHG emissions after the Protocol expires in 2012. The United
States initially opposed any future commitments on GHG
emissions, but eventually withdrew its objection on the conference’s final day of negotiations.6 This cleared the way for
the parties to move forward with post-Kyoto plans.
The United States can still hinder these efforts, given that
as the world’s leading GHG emitter, meaningful action on climate change hinges on its full participation. But with only
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seven years remaining under the Protocol, moving forward
with post-Kyoto talks at this year’s climate conference was
seen as critical, with concern growing that any further delay
would allow the United States to argue that there would not be
enough time to negotiate new emissions targets.7 The United
States could then call for an abandonment of mandatory cuts
and instead focus on its preferred solution to climate change:
technology transfer.8
It is not yet clear what the extent of the post-Kyoto emissions limits will be, but in order to have a chance at staving off
the worst impacts of climate change by 2100, the cuts must be
significantly more than the Protocol’s 5.2 percent reduction.
The original standard for action to combat climate change
is found in the UNFCCC’s Article 2, which calls for the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”9
Although “dangerous anthropogenic interference” lends
itself to a variety of interpretations, there are several frequently offered targets that, if achieved, may avoid the worst effects
of climate change. Targets are most commonly expressed in
terms of GHG emission reductions, temperature changes, and
atmospheric carbon dioxide (“CO2”) concentrations. Each type
of target relies on complex climate science and mathematical
calculations and at best can only offer a probable outcome.
One commonly used benchmark is to limit global average
temperature increase to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial averages (circa 1750s).10 The corresponding reductions in
GHG emissions and limits on atmospheric carbon concentration to achieve this target depend on a series of factors, many
of which can only be estimated within a certain range. One
estimate, in a July 2005 report released by Allianz Group and
the World Wildlife Fund, suggested that limiting global average surface temperature increase to two degrees Celsius would
require a reduction in GHG emissions of 60 to 80 percent from
current levels by 2050 (from almost seven billion tons of carbon emissions per year to under 2.5 billion per year).11
One of the main criticisms of the Protocol is that binding
limits on GHG emissions, even its modest 5.2 percent reduction, will be too costly. But the Protocol’s true value is its regulatory mechanisms that will make future limits on GHG emissions economically feasible.
This is why the second-most significant accomplishment
at the COP 11 was the implementation of the Marrakech
Accords, a set of technical guidelines and regulations on the
Protocol’s key regulatory mechanisms – International
Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation (“JI”), and the Clean
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Development Mechanism (“CDM”). The Marrakech Accords
were negotiated at the COP 7 in 2001 and are sometimes
referred to as the “Kyoto Rule Book.” In effect, they render the
Protocol fully operational.
International emissions trading provides for portions of
Annex I countries’ emissions allowances to be traded on an
international carbon market in order to achieve emissions
reductions in the most cost-effective manner. JI allows Annex
I countries to receive credit for emissions reductions from
investments in other Annex I countries. And the CDM works
in a manner similar to Joint Implementation, except that it
applies to investments in all non-Annex I countries (e.g. developing countries).
The Protocol’s regulatory mechanisms are essential to
achieving its emissions targets because, as market-based regulatory tools, they enable countries to achieve their targets in the
most cost-effective manner possible.
The advantage of binding emissions targets and marketbased mechanisms is that identify the most cost-effective
emissions reductions. For example, the European Union’s
Emissions Trading System (“EU ETS”) entered into force in
January 2005 in order to allow EU Member States to meet
their projected obligations under the Protocol. The goal of the
EU ETS is to reduce GHG emissions by about eight percent
of 1990 levels by 2012. The European Commission has
reported that the costs to industry will range between €2.9 –
€3.7 billion, which is less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic
product in the EU.12 By contrast, achieving the same reduction without an emissions trading system is estimated to cost
approximately twice as much.
This is in part because market-based mechanisms take
advantage of the “Porter Hypothesis” advanced by Michael
Porter and Claas van der Linde – where the application of strict
but flexible environmental standards fosters innovations in
technology whose value meets or exceeds the costs of compliance.13 In using emissions trading, JI, and CDM, the Protocol
creates economic incentives to invest in new technologies that
cut emissions.
These economic incentives are sometimes described as
a technology “pull,” where the regulatory limits on emissions create a commercial demand for new technology. This
is in contrast to a technology “push,” which is simply the
outcome of research and development (“R&D”). Traditional
R&D has already yielded a series of technologies that, if
applied, can drastically lower emissions. For example, an
influential article by Princeton researchers Stephen Pacala
and Robert Socolow argues that a portfolio of technologies
now exists to meet the world’s energy needs over the next
fifty years while still limiting atmospheric CO2 to a trajectory that avoids a doubling of the preindustrial concentration.14 Although no “wedge” (that is, a type of new technology) is a credible candidate for doing the entire job (or even
half the job) by itself, the portfolio as a whole is large
enough that not every wedge has to be used. The wedges
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range from improved energy efficiency and conservation,
such as higher fuel economy standards and the use of hybrid
vehicles, to sequestering CO2 emissions in depleted underground oil and gas reservoirs.
Thus the technology is already here. What is needed are
international legal regimes to create a market “pull” that encourages their wider application. The importance of Kyoto, therefore, is its ability to help policymakers better understand the
relationship between regulation and innovation and how marketbased mechanisms like emissions trading, JI, and CDM spur
profitable methods of reducing emissions. After all, it seems
clear that to achieve emissions reductions as drastic as 60 to 80
percent by mid-century, the most attractive policy response is to
develop ways to make these reductions profitable.
The business community is already catching on, with
numerous Fortune 500 companies pledging to reduce emissions and invest in environmentally-friendly technologies. BP,
for instance, found that it was able to reach its internal target
of reducing emissions by ten percent below its 1990 levels
without cost. Indeed, the company added around $650 million
of shareholder value because the bulk of the reductions came
from the elimination of leaks and waste.15 Dozens of other
major companies have announced GHG reduction targets and
have undertaken new initiatives to combat climate change.16
Additionally, many have called on the Bush Administration to
take stronger action on climate change and begin to regulate
GHG emissions.17
Significant obstacles to tackling climate change still
remain, but the progress made at the COP 11 in Montreal
appears to be a meaningful step in the right direction.
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